Tuesday, January 22, 2008

Nanotech Insights #6

Dear Colleagues,

Last week we discussed the “promoter class” that is undeveloped or missing for nano, small & advanced technology companies.

We called on nanotech companies, private and public ones, to get their promotional activities in order. This amounts to a bit more than IR (Investor Relations); it is a call to put a professional in charge of Financial PR, that outreach to analysts, newsletter writers and new investors.

Moving along:

1. What are the mis-matches of expectations amongst the key players in nanotech investment and finance and how does this negatively impact the success of the traditional VC model for “small tech”?

Today (unlike a few years ago), angel investors behave almost exactly like VCs. They have nearly the identical investment criteria model, because, after all, their “out” is more often than not to VCs.

For that reason, they are investing larger dollar amounts than ever before, AND, importantly, requiring the companies they invest in have the VC formula pre-packaged within their DNA. Where angels once invested $150K, $400K on a development idea, today they want to invest $2M, $4.5M prepping a company to go three rounds (A, B and C) with the big boys for ANOTHER $6M, $18M, $60M, whatever, for a total of $50 - $150M before the much admired IPO.

Oh, by the way, they also want to make 10X their money.

It’s good work if you can get it.

But these really smart angel investors’ (and they are the brightest folks, just nearly universally unsophisticated in A. how to know a 12 year science project from commercial product with great ROI potential and B. how to make money in micro-cap stocks . . . which is the ONLY play for smallmodus operandi is ill-suited for making money in nanotech deals and the like. and advanced tech companies)

The VCs have another mismatch.

How does one make 10X on their money when one invests $100M? Well, you have to sell for $1B PLUS! . . . . really, c’mon, these folks actually must take the public for idiots.

Well, they were . . . for about 2-4 years. But that “train left the station” long ago (2001 to be exact), and I’m afraid “that dog won’t hunt” anymore. Get over it.

IF, and this is a huge “if”, there were nanotech deals and nanotech teams and nanotech business plans and nanotech business models that could support $100M (or even $40M) investment, than we could MATCH the investment mandate with the mandated investment result – 10X required . . . but, we can’t.

There are no such nanotech deals. I’ve seen most of them over the last 5 to 6 years. If they can’t “make it” with $2M to $12M to an exceptional ROI return within 30 months, there is no reason to invest AND certainly no reason to invest more. If it appears they require $100M to meet their exceptional business “opportunity”, check your premises and check your wallet.

We talk to top scientists all the time. The real money (NOW, TODAY) in nanotech and microfluidics and MEMs and opto-electric and the cutting edge of microelectronics, etc. is in enhancements to existing products and niche products. You don’t have to build a $3B market cap company with hundreds of employees to make a great return. In fact, that’s the path to huge losses in this “space” at this time.

It is emphatically NOT in building the Google of Nano or the Genentech of Microfluidics . . . we don’t care how “great” your team is.

Investment banks want to earn fees, get some exceptional warrant exercise profits and not embarrass themslelves. To not embarrass themselves they have to give their institutional, “accredited” and retail investors a good “kick at the dog”. The stock they sell them has to have a good chance of going up; that means it cannot be grossly over-priced, out of the box. Good luck if you’re trying to sell the “great unwashed” 70% of a company that has never made $1 revenue from the sale of a product or service to anyone but the government or 3 national labs for $100M, much less $1B.

Endless mismatches of institutional, corporate and individual expectations, needs, mandates and reality.

2. What alternatives to that model exist and why is the merchant banking model best?

In our opinion, the best model (if it existed) would be a “well-informed” (read, super scientifically, technically, business acumen and financially astute), very wealthy (read $300M+ net worth), opportunistic angel investor or family office that built multiple companies to 15X total investment sales to majors, a public market cap that provided that 15X or 1X investment/year licensing deals.

A great way to compound invested wealth at 30-60% annually, it seems to us.

A small institution that “mimicked” that investor would be a merchant bank or a private equity firm so mandated and focused on this type of approach.

It’s not so simple. There is much more complexity and there is an astounding array of potential profit centers for such a firm (as I detail in the previously mentioned, 24-page white paper I have written on the subject) that go well beyond what we have room for here. Complex, but not difficult or obstruse and it makes total sense: to us and, we firmly believe, for our investors.

For the rare companies the merchant bank invests in, there are alternatives, as well:

Assuming an honest, quite competant, appropriate team, good science and technology, and an ability to get to a working prototype of something that can be manufactured to industrial standards and enter the world of commerce WITHOUT need for a “complete” retooling of an industry, etc within 36 months and needing less than $12M to do so:

Companies could develop privately by so-called “bootstrapping”

Companies could seek licensing/royalty opportunities at the earliest opportunity with major company partners

Companies could work with the denizens of the pink sheets and Bulliten Board markets and offshore gameplaying and raise money; go public

Companies could go public on the AIM or the Toronto Venture Exchange and finance itself that way

Companies could do a “straight” IPO on the NASDAQ

3. Why is the Toronto Venture Exchange the best venue for early stage “small” and advanced tech finance and what are the avoidable pitfalls?

The AIM is expensive. By our reckoning, it takes a US $30M financing to make all the fees feel light in any way. In addition, there is no trading liquidity to speak of on the AIM. It is a great “financing” place for some companies, but almost always a lousy liquidity venue.

On the other hand, the “pinks” and the Bulliten Board, done “right” (and it can be done), are trading venues . . . you are still going to have to do a financing with the reverse takeover of a shell corporation, and that almost always means dealing with financial pros and/or off-shore entities. Who needs the headaches of either?

A straightforward IPO using a small, regional broker/dealer or even a 3rd tier national investment bank has a great “ring” to it. However, here another “mismatch” jumps to the fore. Even small, NASD broker/dealers don’t even want to do $25-$35M deals anymore (much less $10M deals!). Given the current U.S. regulatory and liability environment, these banks are rightfully backing away from fee structures that can’t cover their legal, accounting and due diligence fees . . . plus a profit.

Why do a $30M deal to make $300,000 for the firm (just example numbers)? We are hearing (and have been, for some time) that $40M is about the minimum IPO even a small firm can do . . . and $65M is preferred.

And $40M and higher “small” & advanced tech-related deals don’t make sense.

$2M - $12M deals are the sweet spot for the Toronto Venture Exchange.

Previously known almost exclusively as a natural resource, mining "public venture capital" venue, it is now ripe as an extraordinary venue for smaller IPOs for "small" and advanced technology companies.

U.S., European and Asian companies are MOST WELCOME on the exchange and do not have to become Canadian companies to be admitted for trading (caveat – we are not attorneys).

Direct A or even seed round deals are possible as well as exits or liquidity and financing events for traditional VCs.

Lack of banker support after the IPO and dumping by speculative, short-term investors of stock on the first 5-20% of profit are leading issues on the Toronto. One overcomes and pre-empts these with sophisticated planning and action.

Professionals must do effective Financial PR that takes into account all the legal and U.S. regulatory hurdles.

While Sarbanes-Oxley compliance is not required, excellent Canadian securities attorneys and accountants work with your existing legal and accounting firms at a combined cost that is usually less than the burden would be in the U.S. public markets alone.

We hope you will contact us to pursue these ideas further to mutual benefit.

Again, I will be speaking in Vancouver, Canada from January 19 – 25, Indian Wells, CA on February 5 and Phoenix, AZ from February 7 – 10 and and I would like to invite each of you to contact me to set an appointment at any of those places to discuss mutually profitable business ideas.

I am always available to meet in San Diego or Los Angeles, or call or email me at the below.

Best regards,

Darrell Brookstein

Managing Director

The Nanotech Company, LLC

www.Nanotechnology.com

darrell@nanotechnology.com

Tuesday, January 15, 2008

Nanotech Insights #5

Edited from a letter originally mailed to our closest associates January 6th 2008.

Thank you for joining with me in these Insights.

I will be speaking in Vancouver, Canada from January 19 – 25, Indian Wells, CA on February 5 and Phoenix, AZ from February 7 – 10 and and I would like to invite each of you to contact me to set an appointment at any of those places to discuss mutually profitable business ideas.

Let’s continue from where we left off in the last letter:

First, 3 quick public market information items:

1. NanoSphere (NSPH) went public a couple months ago in an inauspicious way. It opened trading at $14 and ran to $22 within a couple days, seemingly to allow the underwriters to unceremoniously dump their over-allotment “shoe” and now is in $12.50 area. The good news is that NSPH has put a lot of cash in their treasury over the last year relative to their current market cap.

2. Our sources tell us another big nano-related IPO is coming within 6 weeks (good luck in this lousy stock market and advancing recession!) and the domicile of the financing will surprise many.

3. The 2007 numbers for QQQQ representing the NASDAQ ($43 to $51) vs. The Nanotechnology.com Small Technology Stock Index which actually declined
in the same timeframe.

With the caveat that bad stock markets effect all stocks, a few new “small tech” stocks have climbed into our “beat the market” (we'd like their 2008 against their 2009/2010 high) category for the longer term, and they include: ACTL, AFFX, BNT, ELN, LUNA, NANO, NANX, PANL and PCOP at current levels . . . All bets are off if they fall below their lows of the last 6 weeks.

Moving on: Who or what is the “promoter class” that I referred to and which nanotech and “small tech” is lacking?

Great promoters don’t hype a deal or a technology. They are not simply sharp salespeople.

They typically posses outstanding understanding of the business, the market, the technology and the basis for investment success of the deal, company or project AND they are exceptionally capable of communicating these winning strategies and positive outcomes to each of the key players, including investors and the markets.

They make the most money when the deal makes money for EVERYONE including shareholders, employees and founders,

To date, what “our little world” has seen is an incredibly small group of exceptional promoters with weak technologies or companies, or focused on one key player winning to the detriment of others, or those who benefit individually whether a particular company does well or not.

Great promoters (think Steve Jobs in computers or Robert Friedland in mining) are quite rare. Very good ones have not even appeared in our space, but when good ones have appeared they have not put all the elements together. . . not once as far as I can tell. (ok, with few exceptions: certainly Freescale, Applied Film and Illumina have been or were HUGE successes, and their promoters deserve big kudos, but think of all those VC-funded deals with $50M+ invested that have gone nowhere . . . . and are unlikely to go anywhere, either.)

The promoter of a “small” or advanced tech deal does not have to be the CEO, Chairman or CTO. While that is preferable, I have yet to see someone in that role at a “small tech” startup who understands how to generate investment newsletter writer interest or how to “make their stock go up”. The company promoter, a he, she or team, can be hired, usually for fees and stock, to perform this important function, and this has models in a variety of industries.

Please follow this aside: The story goes that when MCI presented an 800 page proposal to first compete with AT & T in the early 1970s to the most prominent communications lawyer in the U.S. to asses the legality of their plan, he scribbled “You can do it.” and signed his name on the cover.

Nothing else.

Paper-clipped to proposal book was a bill for $50,000 (an incredibly large fee for the time). MCI’s board was astounded by the apparent lack of work done, but the opinion stood.

Most business people can relate to this: (Leading lawyers out there will love this.) In the early 1980’s I had a legal question about a real estate transaction, and decided to go to a family practice friend of mine for the advice because he was only $50/hour and . . . well, you can guess the rest. He spent 6 hours researching the subject; charged me $300 . . . and his advice turned out to be incorrect.

About 10 years later I had a similar type of real estate question and found the top real estate attorney in my city. His base was $275/hour. I went in; took 5 minutes to frame and ask my question and he said “Yeah, no problem; you can do that.” His bill was $40! Lesson learned: it pays to deal with an “expensive” expert.

Calling all nanotech companies: Get your promotion house in order; As I say in Nanotech Fortunes, it’s more than legitimate expense; it’s absolutely necessary for success!

If your company or a company you know of doesn’t know how to do it on their own, feel free to call or email me.

Next week will pick up on these questions:

1. What are the mis-matches of expectations amongst the key players in nanotech investment and finance and how does this negatively impact the success of the traditional VC model for “small tech”?

2. What alternatives to that model exist and why is the merchant banking model best?

3. Why is the Toronto Venture Exchange the best venue for early stage “small” and advanced tech finance and what are the avoidable pitfalls?

My good friend, who is a marketing genius, berated me over lunch this week. “Darrell”, he said, “I don’t get what you’re doing with Nanotech Insights. You’re not just going to keep sending out information for free are you? When are you going to ‘ask for the sale’ or at least hint at what you want from the reader.”

I told him the mystery would end soon.

Let’s begin ending it now:

My team is building a merchant banking firm in “small” & advanced technology with one of the most prestigious Scientific Advisory Boards in our field. Our modus operandi and area of deep (I have been working in these markets for 25 of my 33 career years as an investment professional and have funded several dozen companies there) expertise is in the Toronto Venture Exchange. Known as a natural resource, mining "public venture capital" venue, I have been working hard to tune it up as an extraordinary venue for smaller IPOs for "small" and advanced technology companies.

Direct A or even seed round deals are possible as well as exits or liquidity AND financing events for traditional VCs: the caveat is that the “sweet spot” for these deals in Canada is US $2M - $12M total needed.

Our firm’s mandate is to find and fund companies that can get to a 15X investment valuation or a 1X investment annual royalty stream within 30 months, with the ability to go public in Toronto within 8 months/ We have 3 on our plate now. They are difficult to find, as you can imagine.

We are seeking to partner with a professional money raiser.

We are looking to associate with a strong, independent financial partner – a hedge fund, family office. investment bank, mutual fund or other.

We would like to hear from you if you represent a Fortune 2000 company with whom we can develop profitable joint ventures.

If you are or can make an introduction to any of the above, we should discuss it. If you are neither, but you know someone who you believe should be working with us on these goals, I would appreciate your making an appropriate introduction to them. Please call or email me.

Best regards,

Darrell

Darrell Brookstein

Managing Director

The Nanotech Company, LLC

www.Nanotechnology.com

3525 Del Mar Heights Rd. #345

San Diego, CA 92130

858 794 0848

darrell@nanotechnology.com